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JAMES H. WALLACE, JR.*

Overlooked Opportunities-Making the
Most Out of United States Antitrust
Limitations on International
Licensing Practicest
The title of this article, "Overlooked Opportunities-Making the Most Out of
United States Antitrust Limitations on International Licensing Practices," may
seem puzzling if not disturbing to the reader. Unfortunately, all too often parties
to license negotiations view the United States antitrust laws as the enemy-something to be evaded, ignored, or complained about. As a result, companies
sometimes take action which fails to maximize licensing profits. Moreover, in
addition to such commercial losses, companies often find that their inattention to
antitrust details can result in massive litigation expenses and liabilities.
It may therefore be helpful to suggest a few ways to maximize licensing
opportunities by properly recognizing United States antitrust limitations, rather
than ignoring such legal constraints. But first, a brief review of some basic
principles is in order.
I. Some Basic Principles
A. Distance Does Not Necessarily Guarantee Immunity
from United States Antitrust Laws-Capture of the
"Flying Dutchman"
It is obvious and well known to United States companies that they are fully
accountable under the United States antitrust laws for their licensing practices in
the United States courts. And, although most experienced companies now
recognize that just being foreign does not immunize them from United States
antitrust actions, few really understand how easy it is for them to become
defendants in the United States courts.
The United States antitrust laws frequently apply to technology agreements
*Partner. law tirm of Kirkland, Ellis & Rowe, Washington. D.C.
tThis article is based upon a paper delivered by the author at the World Trade Institute, World
Trade Center. in New York City on January 27, 1975.
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between United States and foreign companies if the arrangements involve United
States exports or imports of products, technology, or royalties, or if they relate to
the manufacture or sale of products in the United States.'
Foreign parties are liable for their violations of United States antitrust law and
they often can be sued in United States courts, as has been confirmed by a variety
of actual cases.
United States Government Civil Suits. In recent years, almost all technology
licensing litigation of the United States Justice Department Antitrust Division
has focused on international licensing situations. For example, in the Glaxo
case,2 the government challenged the so-called bulk licensing restrictions which
two giant United Kingdom firms imposed on their United States licensees. The
Anpicillin case' attacked the patent procurement and enforcement practices of a
large United Kingdom drug company.
Similarly, United States v. FarbenfabrikenBayer, A.G.' challenged field of
use restrictions on resale imposed on over one hundred American companies by
the German defendant. Patent licensing practices of another German company
in the industrial chemical area were challenged in United States v. Ziegler. And
of course, the Westinghouse-Mitsubishi6 case is a head-on challenge to the
long-standing exclusive technology agreements between two Japanese companies
and Westinghouse.
These cases illustrate the keen interest which the Antitrust Division's Patent
Section has in foreign technology licensing. In fact, every civil case now being
handled by that 15-attorney group involves at least one foreign company or a
foreign controlled United States company as a defendant.
The naive may believe that government civil suits are really nothing to be
feared-they'll merely order that a defendant stop violating the law. But, as many

'See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (United
States' antitrust laws may be applied to foreign acts having effects in the United States); Japan Gas
Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 233-34 (D.N.J. 1966) (foreign patentee subject to
United States jurisdiction in patent case by virtue of presence of royalty agreement with United States
company). See generally Wallace, Multinational Patent and Know-How Arrangements, 39
ANTITRUST L.J. 791 (1970). But see Neidhart v. Neidhart, S.A., 212 P.T.C.J. A-1 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(foreign patentee can not be sued respecting licensing rights in U.S. courts under Patent Code
"long-arm statute," 35 U.S.C. § 293).
'United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973). See also United States v. Ciba Corp., Civil
No. 791-69 (D.N.J., Complaint filed July 9, 1969); United States v. Ciba Corp. and CPC Int'l Inc.,
Civil No. 792-69 (D.N.J., Complaint filed July 9, 1969); and United States v. Fisons Ltd., Civil No. 69
C 1530 (N.D. Ill., Complaint filed July 23, 1969).
'United States v. Bristol-Myers Co., Civil No. 822-70 (D.D.C., Complaint filed March 19, 1970; see
also In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C. 1972).
'Ci-vil No. 586-68 (D.D.C., Complaint filed March 7, 1968); see also United States v.
Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G. and Chemargo Corp., 1969 Trade Cas. 1 72,918 (D.D.C.) (consent
decree).
'Civil No. 1255-70 (D.D.C., Complaint filed April 24, 1970).
'United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., and Mitsubishi Heavy Indus.,
Ltd., Civil No. C 70-852-SAW (N.D. Cal., Complaint filed April 22, 1970).
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companies have learned the hard way, the result can be much harsher than that.
The Antitrust Division has a vast array of relief tools-none of which is
particularly pleasing to defendants. First, there is the obvious and traditional
"don't do it again" injunction. Such injunctions frequently cover a spectrum of
products much broader than those restrained. 7 Second, the court can require
compulsory sales of the licensed products to all qualified applicants at reasonable
prices to "'pry open to competition"' in the market "'closed by defendants'
illegal restraints,"' as was directed by the Supreme Court in its recent Glaxo
opinion. 8 Compulsory licensing of the restrained patents at reasonable royalties
to all qualified applicants is another painful government remedy revitalized by
the Supreme Court's 1973 Glaxo ruling. But Glaxo gave the government still
another remedy. It can now challenge the validity of licensed patents in
conjunction with its efforts to challenge improper licensing tactics. Furthermore,
as has been accurately stated, government suits have a "Johnny Appleseed" effect
in that they spread the seeds for costly private treble damage litigation."
Government Criminal Actions. Criminal antitrust- actions are especially
important in light of recent amendments to antitrust statutes. Until recently, a
violation of the Sherman Act was a misdemeanor, carrying with it the relatively
small fine of $50,000 per count and a maximum jail sentence of one year which
was seldom imposed. But now, an antitrust violation is a felony, carrying the risk
of up to three years in jail for individuals and a fine of up to $1 million for
corporations per count.10
Jurisdictionally, it is more difficult for the government to prosecute criminal
actions against non-resident companies or individuals than in the case of civil
actions. But, as a practical matter, if a foreign company wants to continue to do
business in North America, it may be subject to these hazards. For example, John
Massaut, a Dutchman who was indicted in 1968 in connection with the alleged
price-fixing quinine cartel11 had ignored the United States indictment for six
years. The indictment remained stagnant in the courts due to lack of his presence.
But, a few months, ago when Massaut was traveling from Amsterdam to South
America, he was arrested attempting to change planes at Kennedy Airport and
held overnight in New York's West End Detention Center, pending the posting of
$100,000 bail the next day. 12
Private Civil Treble Damage Actions. The Clayton Act provides that any
person "injured in his trade or business" can recover three times the amount of

'See, e.g., United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327 (1964).
'410 U.S. at 62.
'Remarks of Sigmund Timberg, APLA BULL. 279, 287 (1969).
"See 685 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-3 (BNA 1974).
"United States v. N. V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 68 Cr. 860
(S.D.N.Y., indictment returned October 25, 1968).
2690 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-6 (BNA 1974).
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his injury plus his attorneys' fees. 13 Such suits frequently result in mammoth
judgments. For example, in the Zenith v. Hazeltine patent pool litigation, the
trial court rendered'a judgment for $35 million, later reduced somewhat by the
Supreme Court.' 4 .
Disabilityof the Licensed Rights. Even if the foreign party cannot be sued in
the United States, having an improper license agreement may pose serious
impediments to enforce the licensed rights either against third parties or the other
party to the contract. The United States "patent misuse" doctrine-a courtcreated defense to patent infringement actions--can preclude the recovery of
royalties from infringers of even valid patents, if such patents are involved in
improper licensing activities.'I
The situations described are the most common ones in which United States
laws are applied against foreign companies in licensing situations. Although not
an exhaustive list, it should provide some insight into the magnitude of the
problem. To be safe, a foreign party to a United States license agreement should
always assume that it is subject to the strictures of the United States antitrust laws
and should be aware that failure to adhere to them could result in serious
complications in United States courts.
B. Summary of Types of Licensing PracticesRaising
Questions Under United States Antitrust Laws:
Beware of Catch Phrases
After recognizing the importance of complying with United States licensing
standards, a company then needs to become familiar with the applicable
substantive law.
Every rule has exceptions. The licensing law arena is filled with catch phrases
and per se characterizations. But with most licensing practices it is necessary to
evaluate the particular conduct by carefully analyzing the factual situation and
applicable legal precedents. Practices which might be defensible in litigation
today are not necessarily recommended for future conduct by a conservative
company seeking to avoid burdensome litigation. With these caveats in mind, it
will be helpful to flag the areas in technology licensing in which antitrust
problems may arise.

"15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
"Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 106 (1969), modified, 401 U.S. 321
(1971).
"See Wallace, Proper Use of the Patent Misuse Doctrine-An Antitrust Defense to Patent
InjfingementActions in Need ofRationalReform. 26 MERCER L. REV. (1975); Nicoson, Misuse
of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 77 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 76 (1962). Even a proposed
improper license not consummated can result in a cause of action or patent misuse defense in the
United States courts. See W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 381 F. Supp. 680, 701-706
(D. Del. 1974).
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1. Price Limitations
Technology agreements setting the price of the licensed product can raise
serious antitrust problems, despite the Supreme Court's famous 1926 General
Electricruling,' 6 and despite recent cases indicating possible areas of permissive
price-fixing in licenses. 7
2. Tie-ins
The licensing practice described by the catch phrase "tie-ins" is frequently said

to constitute a per se violation of the antitrust laws. To be sure, such practices are
often held illegal. But, like other rules, there are always exceptions. For example,
theJerroldcase "8 recognized that entry into a new technological field might justify
tie-in restrictions for a limited time."
3. Domestic TerritorialRestrictions

Licensing provisions specifying the territories in which a licensee may operate
require careful analysis. To be sure, the Patent Code provides that a patentee may

grant "an exclusive right" under its patent "to the whole or any specified part of
the United States." ' 0 At least one recent case holds that this assignment statute
legitimizes domestic territorial restrictions which might otherwise violate the
antitrust laws. 2 However, some antitrust authorities strongly disagree with this
contention. 22 In any event, few patentees seek to take advantage of the apparent
permissiveness of the statute. There has been very little litigation on the subject.23
4. InternationalTerritorialLimitations

One of the most exciting and important current topics in technology licensing is
the propriety of territorial limitations in international licensing agreements.

Frequently a patentee will license his patent in one country while refraining from
licensing counterpart patents in other countries. This may well have the same
effect as an explicit agreement dividing territories. But this practice is believed by
'"United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). See generally Gibbons, Price-Fixingin
Patent Licenses and the Antitrust Laws, S VA. L. REV. 273 (1965).
"See, e.g., Congoleum Indus. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F. Supp. 220, 228-231 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
"United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960). affd per curiam,
365 U.S. 567 (1961); see also Address by Richard H. Stern before Licensing Executives Society in New
York City. April 5, 1967.
"See also Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 931 (1961) (refusal to sell patented devices unless installed in seller's container not illegal
"tie-in" where restriction was motivated by quality control considerations).
2035 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
"Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 417-418 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
917 (1974).
22Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the PatentMonopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76
YALE L.J. 267, 347-352 (1966); Gibbons, Domestic TerritorialRestrictions in Patent Transactiors
and the Antitrust Laws, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 893 (1966); Turner, The Patent System and
Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 450, 474-76 (1969).

"See ABA, Antitrust Law Developments, Ch. 9,
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many to be perfectly legal since the territorial barriers are based on different
statutory exclusive grants, i.e., the various patents.24 In the simple example
given, this is probably correct.
The problem becomes more difficult, however, in cases involving cross-licenses
providing for mutually exclusive territories. Such arrangements, especially if
coupled with still further restrictions, can quickly lead to situations similar to the
classic cartel cases. 25 And the problem becomes even more complex when the
cross-licenses include provisions for the exchange of technology and patents
developed in the future, such as is alleged in the government's WestinghouseMitsubishi complaint. 2 6 Of course, an entirely different assessment may be
required if the territorial division is achieved by licensing unpatented
know-how. "'
In any event, international territorial limitations present challenging questions
for thoughtful legal analysis. As the chief of the Antitrust Division's Foreign
Commerce Section recently conceded, the old cartel cases leave a great deal of
uncertainty in this area because of their complex factual situations and the
28
presence in those cases of an aggregation of restraints.
5. Fields of Use
Another catch phrase used to describe licensing limitations is the so-called
"field of use" restriction.29 The legality of such a provision is particularly difficult
to assess in the abstract because there is no uniformity as to what the phrase
means as used by the judges or patentees. Some people use the term in a technical
sense to describe different uses of a single patented device. For example, the same
patented materials might be useful in an industrial process as well as in ladies'
jewelry. Other people use the phrase "field of use" to describe marketing
restrictions. For example, "wholesale distribution only," "animal use only," or
"finished" as opposed to "bulk" products.
Frequently, what people perceive as field of use restrictions are not restrictions
at all in the usual commercial sense, but are legitimate devices by which a

2
Remarks of Bruce B. Wilson before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference, Boston,
Mass., Nov. 6, 1970; Stern, The Antitrust Status of Territorial Limitations in International
Licensing, 14 IDEA 580 (1970-71).
"E.g., Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. National
Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
"'United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., and Mitsubishi Heavy
Indus., Ltd., Civil No. C 70-852-SAW (N.D. Cal., Complaint filed April 22, 1970).
"Stern, The Antitrust Status of TerritorialLimitations in InternationalLicensing, 14 IDEA 580,
589-90 (1970-71).
"Address by Joel Davidow before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section, Honolulu,
Hawaii, August 13, 1974, 43 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 530 (1975).
"See generally General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938);
Gibbons, Field Restrictions in Patent Transactions:Economic Discrimination and Restraint of
Competition, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 423 (1966).
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patentee protects his royalty income. 30 For example, the owner of a patent on
electrical motors might want to charge ten cents per unit for small home electric
fan motors, but thousands of dollars for large units used in locomotives. If the
licensee were interested only in one or two sizes, there might be no mention of
other sizes or "fields" in the agreement. But, to be safe, the patentee could state
in the license that the provision is inserted merely for the purpose of defining what
can be done by that licensee at the specified royalty rate. Other fields could be
made available to the licensee upon request at an appropriate royalty rate.
6. Grantbacks
Provisions requiring the licensee to grant back future improvement inventions
raise a variety of legal questions. Relying on the Supreme Court's 1947
Transparent Wrap decision, 3 the naive may just assume that grantbacks are
always legal. However, even assuming the continued viability of the old
Transparent Wrap case, grantbacks can, under certain circumstances, raise
antitrust and patent misuse problems. Factors to be considered in evaluating the
legality of a particular grantback include whether the grantback provision
assigns the entire improvement rights or is a mere non-exclusive license to the
patentee, whether there are a number of licenses containing provisions whereby
the patentee can funnel back everybody's improvements to himself, whether the
patentee will pay a royalty to the licensee developing the improvement, whether
the licensor competes with the licensee, and whether other restrictions are in the
agreement."3
7. Miscellaneous
One should not assume that the foregoing is a complete inventory of possible
licensing pitfalls. It includes many but by no means all of the antitrust trouble
spots encountered in technology licensing. There are others, such as resale
problems, 33 exclusive dealing requirements, 34 improper procurement and
enforcement of the patents,"3 and agreements tending to inhibit further licensing,

"°SeeAddress by Richard H. Stern before Licensing Executives Society in New York City, April 5,
1967; Remarks of Bruce B. Wilson before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference, Boston,
Mass., Nov. 6, 1970; Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L. J. 267, 339-46 (1966); Turner, The PatentSystem and Competitive
Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 470-471 (1969).
"Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
32
Chevigny, The Validity of Grant-Back Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 34 FORDHAM L.
REV. 569 (1966).
"Compare United States v. Glaxo Group Limited, 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969), modified, 410
U.S. 52 (1973) with Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970).
Berlenback v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 830 (1964).
3'E.g.,

"See ABA, Antitrust Law Developments, Ch. 9,
(1975).
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such as "semi-exclusive licenses." 3 ' Moreover, the manner in which a licensee's
royalties are calculated can raise a full spectrum of antitrust problems."

In any event, whatever the particular licensing limitation may be, questions
regarding its legality should not be answered in the abstract. Although the catch
phrases and per se characterizations can provide some guidance in staying away
from risky areas, they are not substitutes for a sophisticated factual and legal
analysis. Most of the per se antitrust rules have exceptions. 38 Likewise, conduct

which alone is innocent can become part of an overall antitrust violation in the
context of a particular factual situation. 9With these substantive guides in mind,
we can now examine methods of making the most of them.
H. Suggested Approaches to Licensing for Maximizing
Opportunities Available and Minimizing
Risks in View of Present Antitrust Limitations
To be sure, some critics of United States antitrust law have advanced sound
arguments for reform in various areas. They are to be respected and encouraged
in their efforts to correct apparent shortcomings of the law where appropriate.
But, in the meantime, companies choosing to enter into licensing agreements
must do so with the full awareness of what the law is today and where it is going.
They should maximize their opportunities in view of the existing situations rather
than ignore or flout these very serious licensing considerations. As an aid in doing
this, the following points are suggested:
First, the business objectives sought by companies entering into a licensing
agreement should be carefully outlined and analyzed. All too often, once
businessmen have decided to license, the project is then turned over to others who
routinely pull out the same agreement form they have used in other situations
where the business considerations were entirely different. At a minimum, the
company's objectives should be drafted with a view to avoid complications and to
maximize the business benefits to be derived from the agreement. Failure to
proceed along these lines may result in use of restrictions of questionable legality
and enforceability, but which substantially increase the company's risks, and
provide little commercial benefit in return.

"See "Recent Government Patent Antitrust Suits," Address by Richard H. Stern before Western
Corporate Patent Seminar, Colorado Springs, Colo., Sept. 30, 1968.
"See, e.g., LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966); see generally ABA, Antitrust Law
Developments, Ch. 9, PATENT-ANTITRUST PROBLEMS at 342-344 (1975).
"See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); and Department of Justice Luncheon Speech, "Law on Licensing
Practices: Myth or Reality? or Straight Talk from 'Alice in Wonderland,'" Remarks by Bruce B.
Wilson before the American Patent Law Association, Wash., D.C., Jan. 21, 1975, at 11-13.
"Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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Having the company's business objectives clearly formulated, and with
reasonable business alternatives in mind, the licensing negotiator should be
armed with a good working knowledge of substantive United States law.
Obviously, no one can have all the answers at his fingertips for instant recall. Still,
it is helpful to know which practices are usually legal, which are usually illegal,
and which practices are in the vast gray area of risky conduct.
But, it is not enough just to know what the law is today. It has been stated that
there is a "crusade" ' and a "revolution""' within the Antitrust Division to
change the law, thereby making the law applicable to licensing more restrictive.
Indeed, early this year the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust made
an admitted "Alice in Wonderland" pronouncement . outlining the Division's
enforcement goals. "
Thus, it is important to know the direction the law is taking with respect to.
various kinds of licensing conduct. Today's agreement may run the life of patents'
perhaps not yet issued, or even conceived, especially if the license contains
provisions for future developments. The legality of the license agreement may,
well be questioned many years later in the context of changed legal'
circumstances. 43
To avoid questionable license provisions-thereby minimizing antitrust
exposures and possibly maximizing commercial opportunities by avoiding
restrictions-the licensing negotiator should be prepared to convince the other
party as to the impropriety of proposed provisions, setting forth in a helpful
manner the various consequences-previously discussed-resulting from
government and private actions under the United States antitrust laws.
It should also be emphasized that, if the other party insists on including
licensing provisions of questionable legality, there are several alternatives to
entering such license arrangements. Companies should be prepared to refuse to
enter into agreements involving a high risk situation. Patentees can refuse to
enter such agreements and consider possible ways to enforce their rights. Alleged
infringers can challenge validity and infringement in the courts or wait for the
patentee's infringement suit which may never materialize. Accused infringers
may bring suits for declaratory judgment that the proposed terms are improper
and that the offered patents are disabled under the misuse doctrine.

40Hollabaugh, The ScottAmendments v. The Second PatentCrusade,39 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 780
(1970).
"Remarks of Sigmund Timberg, APLA BULL. 279, 283 (1969).
'2Department of Justice Luncheon Speech, "Law on Licensing Practices: Myth or Reality? or
Straight Talk from 'Alice in Wonderland,"' Remarks by Bruce B. Wilson before the American Patent
Law Association, Wash., D.C., Jan. 21, 1975.
"3See, e.g.. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Mitsubishi Elec., Corp., and Mitsubishi
Heavy Indus., Ltd., Civil No. C 70-852-SAW (N.D. Cal., Complaint filed April 22, 1970) (challenge
to arrangements dating back as early as 1923).
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In sum, to maximize one's position in licensing situations, one must be well
informed as to the business objectives sought, develop a good working knowledge
of substantive antitrust restrictions on licensing, and then be fair, but firm, in
negotiations.
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